2 efficient production of additional supply. Once again, we have acted in crisis to increase the authority and power of the government over economic activity, exchanging freedom and an efficient solution for some temporary relief from the cold.
Government controls and regulations created a shortage of natural gas and prevented a rational solution to the shortage. The government uses the crisis to justify an increase in its power and authority to allocate supply and coerce suppliers. The fact that the grant of power is temporary justifies neither the grant of authority nor the failure to choose a rational solution.
The administration's fiscal program also developed in disregard of freedom and efficiency. The presumption underlying the program is the simple Keynesian view that neglects all effects on incentives, prices and anticipations. What matters for consumption is the amount consumers receive; what matters for investment is the additional amount consumers spend. Thoughtful investors and consumers who project after tax rates of return before deciding to invest could be encouraged by permanent tax reduction, or in other ways, but they are not. Indeed, they cannot for long be encouraged by the fiscal prospects that we face.
The fiscal program neglects freedom and efficiency, also, by protecting the bureaucracy and future budgets from reductions that would increase the efficiency with which society uses resources and the freedom of individuals to decide on how they wish to spend their incomes. The long-run thrust of the Carter program is to balance the government budget only, if at all, by increasing tax rates through inflation, not by reducing the growth of public outlays or the relative size of government.
In three respects, the fiscal program is a strong reminder of some past policies. First, once again, we are to know the arrogance of fine tuning. Second, we are offered another piece of legislation designed by the Association for the Protection of the Civil Service. Third, we return to the failed policy of "priorities 11 that promises lower unemployment now and less inflation later but produces instead a temporary gain in employment followed by more inflation and more unemployment later. I propose to discuss the short-and long-term effects of the administration's program in turn and to offer an alternative.
The Short-Term Problem
The fiscal program is based on two errors. One is judgmental; the other is a conceptual error with several facets. Let me dispose of the judgmental issue quickly since it is rapidly becoming clear that the much discussed slowdown in the economy was misinterpreted by Keynesians eager to believe that, because government spending in the third quarter fell below projections, the economy paused.
If we look at the quarterly rates of change of gross national product in 1976, the expansion reaches a peak rate of change in the first quarter, then slows for the rest of the year. The growth of final sales shows exactly the opposite pattern. Rates of change of final sales in dollars of constant purchasing power are lowest in the first quarter and highest at the end of the year. The difference between the two series is entirely the result of business decisions to first build and then reduce inventories.
There is a simple, Errors in forecasting are not so rare that we should dwell on them. Two percentage points or more is about the average error in quarterly forecasts of the rate of change of real GNP and the price level in recent years.
The more serious problem arises from the type of action proposed.
The fiscal program appears to be based on a belief that economists can achieve more output now without increasing the rate of inflation. This is to be done by timing the injections of stimulus and restraint so as to bring idle resources into use. The critical underlying assumption is that, bottlenecks aside, larger supplies of output can be produced without raising the rate of price change. Even avid proponents of additional stimulus recognize that the stimulus must be reduced when the economy approaches full employment. We have returned to fine tuning.
Instead of general policies that provide relatively clear indications of the thrust to be exerted by government programs, private decision makers face increased uncertainty.
To make plans, they must guess at the type of tax structure and the length of time reductions in unemployment insurance taxes or increases in investment tax credits will remain in effect. To estimate future sales, they must guess at the size and duration of the effect of the rebate.
Behind the fiscal package lies the belief that economists can predict the effect of various mixes of stimuli with sufficient accuracy to provide a choice to policymakers. The alternative of providing a more stable fiscal environment is rejected. This, too, is a return to fine tuning. I do not know any evidence to support the belief that economists can predict the short-term aggregate effects of specific tax cuts with sufficient accuracy to justify the policies that are now proposed.
Long-Term Effects
Choice of a one-time rebate instead of general tax reduction is a way of maintaining future tax collections. President Carter has promised a balanced budget for fiscal year 1981, and permanent tax reduction would permit that promise to be kept only if the growth of government falls or the rate of inflation rises. Speculation on whether the administration can achieve a balanced budget for fiscal 1981 generally ignores the effects of inflation. Since the tax system is not indexed, a balanced budget can be achieved by allowing inflation to rise.
In The effects of inflation on tax payers remain in a fully anticipated inflation. To these, we must add the effects of unanticipated inflation.
Unanticipated inflation taxes owners nominal wealth. These effects are more frequently discussed by economists, but they are much smaller than the effects of anticipated inflation on tax payments. Lower inflation would also change the real returns to capital by reducing the tax on existing capital, thereby changing the composition of output, the size of capital gains and capital gains taxes, and the like. Adjustments to steady inflation by investors and consumers would undo many of the adjustments that have been made, for example reducing investment in land or gold stocks relative to investment in depreciable capital. All of these, and many other, effects on taxes, spending and output are ignored.
We cannot hope to end inflation by 1978 and remain on a path toward full employment. The first effects of the sharp reduction in the rate of monetary expansion will cause revision of plans. Those who accumulated inventories or planned production or spending on the assumption of sustained inflation must adjust planning to the new environment. Unemployment will increase and the growth of output and perhaps output will at first fall.
Gradually, it will return to its growth path at a lower average rate of inflation, but government payments for welfare and unemployment compensation will be larger and tax collections smaller. The actual deficit would be much larger than the $162 billion if there is an attempt to end inflation suddenly. The $162 billion is an estimate of the effect of Inflation on government revenues and outlays, not a projection of the effect on the deficit of an end to inflation.
In the past several years, we have seen that the economy can recover while inflation is ended gradually. A policy of reducing the growth rate of money by stages has brought a recovery from recession, expansion, The increase in fuel costs is seen as an opportunity to grant additional relief to families that pay more for heating. At the same time, there are proposals for additional stimulus for the economy on the grounds that higher spending on utulities must be offset to cushion the shock to employment.
Apparently, those who receive the additional payment for food or fuel are expected to withhold their receipts from the spending stream, so government must correct their behavior.
I will not dwell on the obvious reasons why this argument is wrong. Even if it were correct, it is fine tuning with a vengeance. Every shift in spending brings a new program or an addition to an old program. The government takes responsibility for smoothing out the ripples in economic life disregarding that their forecasts of the ripples are subject to large errors and that their actions create uncertainties about the future that are at times as disturbing and unsettling to the economy as the ripples they attempt to smooth.
We need not continue to restrict freedom and reduce efficiency in the interests of full employment. There is an alternative path to full employment that uses our resources, increases freedom and encourages efficiency.
Inflation, restrictions, prohibitions and regulations not only reduce the return to capital and labor and discourage investment, but they transfer resources to less productive uses. If we reduce the army of regulators to a brigade or platoon, we raise productivity by transferring resources from less efficient to more efficient activities. Those engaged in negotiation over the rules and their application are directed to more productive tasks.
Productivity increases and saving is attracted from the many other places
In the world where restrictions, disencentives, and regulations lower the rate of investment in new and more productive facilities.
Many countries have followed the path we have followed. They, too, restrict freedom and efficiency in the use of resources, limit returns to investment, and create uncertainty about the future. By increasing freedom and encouraging efficiency, we can raise our standard of living and develop opportunities for employment at higher real earnings and with more freedom to decide how we spend our incomes.
